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Introduction
In 2008, the Indiana legislature passed and the governor
signed into law House Enrolled Act No. 1001, now referred
to as Public Law 146-2008, which capped Indiana school
districts’ ability to raise revenues from the local property tax
without local voter approval. To phase in the impact of the
law, the state provided school districts with levy replacement
grants in 2009 and 2010 that offset losses of greater than 2%
of their property tax revenues. In 201l, the levy replacement
grant program expired, and schools districts experienced
the full impact of the law. As a result, property taxes for
homesteads1 were capped at 1%, agricultural land at 2%, and
nonresidential real property at 3% of total assessed value
(Indiana Department of Local Government Finance 2008). For
school boards hesitant to seek voter approval of higher taxes,
these caps represented a potential loss in funding. To that end,
the exploratory study described in this article analyzed the
law’s impact on the school districts by demographic type and
sought to establish the predictive value of select independent
variables on school district funding losses attributable to
property tax caps.
The article is divided into four sections. Following this
introduction is a section on the background of this property
tax reform in Indiana and a comparison to other states. The
next section provides a description of the methodology used
in the study while the third section discusses findings. In the
final section, conclusions and recommendations for future
research are presented.
Background
Due to a series of state supreme court and state tax court
decisions between 1996 and 1998, Indiana revised its true
value tax system to reflect a market value system with an
initial reassessment of real property in 2001 (Faulk 2004).
Under the previous assessment method, true tax value was
based on “reproduction cost” rather than the current marketbased system of “replacement cost” in current building
techniques and methods. Reproduction costs were defined
as what it would take to reproduce the structure on the
existing land or lot based on materials used and methods
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used in the time of the structure’s construction. In addition,
annual adjustments or “trending” of property values became
part of Indiana’s move to a market-based assessment system
that began in 2002. Trending required assessors to research
sales of properties in a particular area over the previous two
years. Using that information, assessors then estimated the
values of other properties in the same area to determine
an assessed value. This change in property tax assessment
resulted in significant increases in assessed value for residents
and concomitant increases in their property taxes. Public Law
146-2008 represented the state’s efforts to respond to this
phenomenon through “property tax reform;” that is, the use of
state-imposed local property tax caps.
Historically, states have responded to dramatic increases in
assessed value of property in a variety of ways. For example,
in 1978, California voters approved Proposition 13, which
reduced property taxes to 1% for homestead and commercial
property and limited the growth rate of future assessments to
2% (Glyn and Drenkard 2013). Then, in 1980, Massachusetts
voters passed Proposition 2 ½ which served to reduce local
property tax growth in two manners. First, it limited the
annual growth of local property tax collections to no more
than 2.5% of the previous year’s levy limit, plus new growth.2
However, this percentage could be exceeded by local
voter approval. Second, property tax collections could not
exceed 2.5% of assessed valuation, even with voter approval
(Massachusetts Department of Revenue n.d.).3
In 1992, Colorado voters approved a constitutional
amendment referred to as the Taxpayer Bill or Rights (TABOR).
In its original form, TABOR restricted revenues at both the
state and local levels. State and local government units,
including school districts, could not raise tax rates without
voter approval or spend revenues collected under existing
tax rates if revenues grew faster than the rate of inflation
and population (Colorado Department of the Treasury
n.d.). However, in 2005, Colorado voters returned to the
polls passing Referendum C, which eliminated revenue
limits from 2006 to 2010 and made modifications to the
original amendment after that period to make it less onerous
(Colorado Legislative Council Staff 2009; Lav and Williams
2010).
A potential consequence of property tax caps is an
increase in bonding. For example, after implementation of
Public Act 87-17, the “Property Tax Extension Elimination
Law,” in 1991, enacting assessment caps in Cook County and
contiguous “collar” counties in Illinois, school district bonded
debt increased (Illinois Department of Revenue n.d., Rudow
2003). In 1993, Michigan capped school district general fund
property tax revenues. According to Rudow (2003, 543), the
Michigan property tax cap had four major outcomes: (1)The
value of bonds passed tended to increase in high spending
districts by 172%; (2) The value of bonds passed tended to
increase for low spending districts by 26%; (3) The property
values of high spending districts tended to drop; and (4) High
spending districts were able to exceed the cap by passing
more operational expenses on to debt service. Because the
ability to fund normal maintenance and upkeep were limited
by statute, Michigan school districts also tended to delay
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facility improvements, which resulted in increased use of
bonding, particularly with regard to schools safety (Zimmer
and Jones 2005).
Methodology
Of Indiana’s 294 school districts, 293 were included in
the study.4 The school district was the unit of analysis. Data
sources were reports of the Indiana General Assembly (2009,
2013), Indiana Department of Local Government Finance
(2011, 2013), and Indiana Department of Education (2009,
2012).5
Variables
Current assessed value of real property for 2009 and 2012.
Real property was defined as land and structures. It included
agricultural and nonagricultural land; houses; and commercial
and factory buildings.
Debt service ratio. A school district’s debt service ratio
equaled its total indebtedness divided by its assessed
valuation of property.
Total indebtedness. Total indebtedness was the sum of a
school district’s temporary loans, school bonds, retirement
bonds, and lease/rental agreements. It is also referred to as
total principal obligation or total principal owed.
Demographic profile type. The Indiana Department of
Education classifies each school district as either metro
(Demotype 1), suburban (Demotype 2), town (Demotype 3), or
rural (Demotype 4) based upon the U.S. Census Bureau’s locale
codes classification system for school districts which focuses
on population density of the district, not just the school’s
physical location. In Indiana, rural school districts are the most
common demographic profile type with 158 school districts.
Net Property tax cap credit or “net credit”. The net property
tax cap credit was designed by Indiana lawmakers as a credit
to local property taxpayers in a school district. At the same
time, this variable represented a financial loss to school
districts. In this study, this variable represented an estimate of
the amount of money a school district lost due to the property
tax cap in 2011 after state replacement grants expired in 2010.
Capital projects fund statutory limit. A school district’s
capital projects fund statutory limit under Act 388 is $0.4167
per $100 of assessed property value.
Data Analysis Procedures
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze mean net
credits, or losses, experienced in 2009 and 2012 by Indiana
school districts. Second, the strength of debt service ratio,
assessed valuation of property, and/or total indebtedness as
predictors of variations in net credit was analyzed through a
general linear model (GLM.)
Analysis of Results
ANOVA with a Bonferonni adjustment and Tukey grouping
together found statistically significant differences in
mean property tax cap credits across school districts by
demographic type. (See Tables 1-4.) In 2009, mean property
tax credits for suburban and small town school districts were
similar and significantly different from those for metropolitan
and rural school districts. In 2012, these relationships had
9
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Table 1 | ANOVA Results of School District Mean Net Credit by Demographic Type: 2009
Source

Degrees of Freedom

Sum of Squares

Mean Square

F Value

Pr >F

3

1.3634

4.5447

26.22

<.0001

Error

281

4.8704

1.7332

Corrected Total

284

6.2338

Model

R-Square=0.2187
Coefficient of Variation=255.4500
Root MSE=1,316,524
Net Credit Mean=515,374.5

Table 2 | ANOVA Results of School District Mean Net Credit by Demographic Type: 2012
Source

Degrees of Freedom

Sum of Squares

Mean Square

F Value

Pr >F

4

1.9696

4.5447

26.22

<.0001

Error

284

6.6049

1.7332

Corrected Total

288

8.5745

Model

R-Square=0.2297
Coefficient of Variation=225.3235
Root MSE=1,525,019
Net Credit Mean=676,813.1

Table 3 | Tukey’s Grouping of District Demographic Type Transformed Data: 2009
Tukey Grouping

Mean

Number

Demotype

A

1,133.33

36

1

B

675.65

61

2

C

467.28

30

3

D

202.31

158

4

Notes: Demotype 1=Metro; Demotype 2= Suburban; Demotype 3=Small Town; Demotype 4=Rural.
Means with the same letter are not significantly different.

Table 4 | Tukey’s Grouping of of District Demographic Type Transformed Data: 2012
Tukey Grouping

Mean

Number

Demotype

A

2,406,429

37

1

B

1,312,114

62

2

C

385,372

30

3

D

85,306

160

4

Notes: Demotype 1=Metro; Demotype 2= Suburban; Demotype 3=Small Town; Demotype 4=Rural.
Means with the same letter are not significantly different.
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changed, and small town and rural school districts were
similar and significantly different from metropolitan and
suburban school districts.
Next, the analysis turned to predictors of variations in
the net tax credit. A general linear model was used where
predictor variables—district debt ratio, assessed valuation
of property, and total indebtedness—were used alone and
in combination to reach the maximum amount of variation
in the dependent variable, district net tax credit, in 2009 and
2012. The results indicated that the model using all three
predictor variables explained the greatest amount of variation
at approximately 51% for 2009 and 50% for 2012.
Conclusions
The purpose of this exploratory study was to analyze
the impact of state-imposed property tax caps on Indiana
school districts by demographic type, where demographic
type was defined as metropolitan, suburban, town, or rural.
The study also sought to establish the predictive strength of
school districts’ debt ratio, assessed valuation of property,
and total indebtedness in relationship to their net property
tax credit. The net property tax credit represented a credit to
local property taxpayers in a school district, i.e., a reduction
in their property taxes. Conversely, the net property tax credit
represented a loss of revenue to school districts. Two years
of data were used in the study. While the law was enacted in
2008, it did not take full effect until 2011. As such, 2009 data
were used as a base for comparison with 2012, a year after the
full implementation of the law.
The results of the study indicated that there was a shift in
the impact of the net property tax credit between 2009 and
2012. In 2009, the mean net property tax credits for suburban
and small town school districts were similar and significantly
different from those for metropolitan and rural school districts.
In 2012, these relationships had changed: Small town and
rural school districts were similar and significantly different
from metropolitan and suburban school districts. Using a
general linear model, school districts’ debt ratio, assessed
valuation of property, and total indebtedness predicted 51%
of the variation in school districts’ net property tax credits in
2009 and 50% in 2012.
These results indicate the need for further research, adding
additional years of analysis to the study in order to determine
if initial shifts in the impact of the net property tax credit
across types of school districts are sustained. Also, while
school districts’ debt ratio, assessed valuation of property,
and total indebtedness predicted around half of the variation
in school districts’ net property tax credits in 2009 and
2012, analysis of additional years of data will be helpful in
establishing whether or not these independent variable retain
their predictive power.

Endnotes
1
In Indiana, a homestead is an individual’s principal place
of residence consisting of a dwelling and up to one acre of
immediately surrounding real estate.
It should be noted that there were some exclusions for debt
service.
2

3

This is also referred to as the levy ceiling.

One school district, the La Porte Community Schools, did not
have sufficient data for inclusion in the study.
4

5

Calendar year data were used for the study.
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